The Kremlin and NATO Ballistic Missile Defense
By Zach Paikin
In an era when nuclear weapons have been produced by a rogue regime in North Korea and such weapons could fall into the hands of radical Islamists in Iran and Pakistan, why do Russian perspectives need to be taken into account by Western states when the latter attempt to ensure their own security?
Of these three potential threats (Iran, North Korea and Pakistan), the most challenging for NATO states in Europe appears to be Iran. The latter poses three principal threats to the security of these states.
First, a nuclear-armed Iran would threaten Western allies in the Levant and in the Gulf regions of the Middle East. Conceivably, if the Islamic Republic were to develop weapons of mass destruction, it could threaten the security or stability of Western-backed Middle Eastern states that ensure regional stability because of their military or diplomatic clout (e.g. Israel and Jordan, respectively) as well as states that ensure the oil interests of America’s European allies (e.g. Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya). Indeed, such oil is even more essential to safeguarding the interests of NATO states in Europe than it is to protecting America’s vital interests, seeing as only the latter can count on Canadian oil production to provide for a significant amount of its domestic oil consumption.
Iran Threat Drives West’s BMD Efforts
Second, due to its geographical location, an Iran with nuclear weapons very much threatens European states directly. Israeli intelligence suggests that Iran’s Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 missiles would have a range of 3,000-5,000 km, although Iran denies that it has produced or deployed any missile in the Shahab class beyond the Shahab-3.[1] (The range of the Shahab-3 is 1,280-1,930 km, long enough to reach Eastern Europe.[2]) This threat becomes even more serious if Iran can position such missiles in the Hezbollah-controlled regions of Lebanon, or worse, if nuclear weapons – be they positioned in the form of warheads on a missile or not – are given by Tehran to international terrorist groups.
Iranian Shahab-3 ballistic missile.
Third, Iranian development of nuclear weapons would endanger the functionality of nuclear non-proliferation within international law. If Iran manages to repeatedly violate its safeguards commitments as stipulated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and eventually develop a nuclear weapon, then the ability of European states to project soft power (i.e. diplomacy) as a means of preventing the production of nuclear weapons – as opposed to America’s hard power (i.e. military force) – would be greatly diminished if not destroyed. Europe’s relative influence and power in the international system would be significantly reduced.
Russia factors into the equation when we realize that Iranian ballistic missiles fired at European states are likely to travel through Russian airspace before arriving at their target. When it comes to the deployment of missile defense systems to protect against such an attack, we reach a conundrum along three lines.
The first issue is that the mutual assured destruction (MAD) logic of the Cold War is unlikely to apply when it comes to preventing an Iranian nuclear attack. If we assume that Iran is an irrational actor due to its theocratic character, then it will be unlikely to fear the consequences of Western retaliation to a nuclear attack on Europe. Even if we assume that Iran is a rational actor, certain Western allies outside of Europe cannot survive a nuclear attack due to their small size and lack of a secure second strike capability (e.g. Israel). Tehran may well calculate that it is worth trading a small number of Iranian cities for the destruction of the Jewish state, something that is achievable if an Israeli ballistic missile defense (BMD) system fails just once.
The second issue revolves around Russian abilities. Russia currently does not possess a mid-course missile defense system (i.e. the capability to shoot down ballistic missiles passing over Russian territory headed toward European states).[3] Hence, barring successful future cooperation with Russia in this field, certain NATO states – depending on their geographical location – would have to rely exclusively upon terminal phase interceptors (i.e. a missile defense system located near the defended site in question).
The third issue, however, is more complicated. Unlike the first, which can be partially addressed through international sanctions and potentially military action, and the second, which would necessitate closer technological cooperation over the long term, this issue revolves around Russian perceptions and will be very difficult to rectify.
From 1972 until 2002, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty ensured that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union (and later, Russia) could develop BMD systems in order to ensure that the concept of MAD could work. Without missile defense, mutual destruction in the case of a nuclear attack was assured. The George W. Bush administration withdrew the United States from the treaty in 2002, due to its perception that the primary missile threat emanated no longer from Russia but instead from rogue regimes and hence the United States needed to deploy missile defense systems to protect against this threat.
Since 2002, the goal of the United States and Russia has remained the same, namely freedom from a nuclear attack. The means of achieving this goal, however, are now different. The United States seeks to protect itself through the deployment of a missile defense system while Russia pursues the same goal by amassing offensive nuclear weapons. Even though Russia’s offensive missiles could easily overwhelm any NATO BMD system, Moscow believes that the construction of such a system upsets the strategic balance with which it is comfortable and hence poses a direct threat to Russian security.[4]
What further complicates the situation is where part of NATO’s BMD system would have to be positioned in order to defend against an Iranian attack, namely Eastern Europe. Several SM-3 mid-course interceptor missiles are scheduled to be deployed by the United States and rendered operational in Romania by 2015 and in Poland by 2018, while negotiations continue between the U.S. and Bulgaria.[5] All three of these Eastern European states are former members of the Warsaw Pact turned members of NATO. With Moscow asserting that former Warsaw Pact states belong to a sphere in which Russian interests are privileged, America’s ability to protect its NATO allies could be hampered if Russia doesn’t play along.
We are led to conclude that NATO states risk undermining their goal of reducing nuclear weapons globally – particularly those nuclear weapons deployed or stockpiled by Russia – if they pursue their plans to build missile defense systems in Europe.
Land-based SM-3 concept.
Taking a closer look, however, we can see that the Russian position vis-à-vis NATO and the U.S. is more complex than it seems.
When it comes to the Kremlin in particular, its goals are very clear: Having lost the global superpower status it held during the Cold War, Moscow seeks to increase its relative influence and power at the expense of that of the United States and its allies. Moscow clearly views NATO expansion toward the east and Western attempts to deploy missile defense systems in Europe as threats to Russian security. In this vein, the Kremlin has sought to undermine the position of the United States on issues related to nuclear proliferation, missile defense, and even conventional military advances while allowing Washington to believe that Moscow is cooperating with it on issues of American interest, notably non-proliferation.
Russia-U.S. Arms Control Agreements Hinder BMD
For instance, the Obama administration has showered considerable praise upon the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) signed in 2010 by Presidents Obama and Medvedev. President Obama believes that the treaty advances his goal of reducing the number of strategic nuclear missile launchers between the United States and Russia while setting an example for other states interested in global nuclear arms reduction and non-proliferation. These states, in turn, may be more inclined to support American sanctions against Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs after having witnessed American commitment to nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, President Obama estimates that partnering with Moscow on nuclear disarmament could lead to Russian support for U.S.-sponsored resolutions against Iran and North Korea in the United Nations Security Council.
In reality, however, the situation is less straightforward. New START is more likely to threaten America’s strategic capabilities than it is likely to secure them.
First, New START will actually force the United States to make unilateral reductions in its strategic nuclear weapons arsenal while allowing for Russia – largely thanks to the resources and funding Moscow has put into the modernization of its strategic forces – to increase its number of deployed forces to as high as 2,100 strategic nuclear weapons, despite the treaty’s ceiling of 1,550 warheads.[6]
Second, the Kremlin has smartly crafted New START to go beyond limiting American offensive nuclear weapons. Certain elements of the treaty go so far as to limit some types of strategic conventional forces – notably those that can be used for prompt global strike (PGS) – on the presumption that these forces could be used to deploy nuclear warheads. Furthermore, the treaty limits America’s ability to convert certain missile launchers for missile defense purposes.[7] This represents a key victory for the Kremlin as it undermines America’s ability to pursue technically achievable options for missile defense without – in this case – deploying additional forces.
When it comes to utilizing the reduction of strategic arms between the United States and Russia as a means of obtaining the Kremlin’s support for sanctions against Iran and North Korea, this too remains dubious, particularly on the Iranian front. (The destabilization of the Korean Peninsula through continued North Korean nuclear weapons proliferation could directly threaten Russian security, particularly due to North Korea’s ties to China. Moscow fears the latter’s geopolitical, economic and military rise.) Although the White House clearly views Iran’s nuclear program as a threat to international peace and security, the Kremlin’s view is not necessarily identical.
Indeed, Moscow views nuclear proliferation as a threat to its security, but much less of a threat than, say, the growth of U.S.-NATO influence in the post-Soviet space or the development by NATO of a missile defense system in Europe. In fact, the Kremlin views Iran less as a threat and more as a partner or client. Moscow sees Iran as a force for checking the influence of both Turkey and the United States in the Middle East and in the Black Sea/Caspian region while acting as a counterbalance to Sunni extremists in Central Asia and the North Caucasus that threaten to further destabilize former Soviet republics.[8]
When pressured – or at a time of strong international posture against Iran’s nuclear program – Moscow has toned down its relationship with Tehran by slowing the completion of Iran’s Russian-sponsored nuclear reactor in Bushehr or by blocking the sale to Iran of S-300 surface-to-air missiles – meant to deter or prevent a successful American or Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, the long-term trend leans toward a favorable Russian position toward Tehran.
Russia’s Security Calculations Drive its Relations with Iran, China and the West
The Kremlin naturally seeks to place what it sees as direct threats to Russian security ahead of what America considers to be threats to international peace. If one of the White House’s top priorities is to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of rogue, undemocratic regimes, then the Kremlin’s goal will be to partner with such regimes in order to undermine American and Western strategic gains so long as these rogue regimes do not pose a direct threat to Russian security.
In sum, the Kremlin’s stance on NATO missile defense goes beyond missile defense itself: If NATO missile defense plans continue without full-fledged Russian approval, then Moscow will attempt to undermine American and Western interests in other arenas, particularly since Moscow views these missile defense systems as a means of preventing Russia’s renewed rise.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (left) and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Moscow’s position is based upon a realist worldview and will remain consistent regardless of who occupies the Kremlin following the 2012 presidential election in Russia. Indeed, United Russia governs Russia de facto as a one-party state and the odds against any candidate besides Prime Minister Putin or President Medvedev earning the next term in the Kremlin are quite long. If Medvedev wins a second term with Putin’s approval, then the positions of Kremlin outlined above are unlikely to change. If Putin returns to the Kremlin, then the positions of the latter are also unlikely to change, seeing as the issue of missile defense has been center stage since the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, at which time Putin was president.
There could be a substantial change, however, if tension increases within the Medvedev-Putin diarchy in 2012. If there is a challenge for the presidency next year, then other factors within Russia may well play a significant role in the upcoming Russian election and hence in the formulation of Russia’s foreign policy in the years ahead.
In the case of a serious challenge for the presidency, it is quite likely that the Russian intelligence and security services will align themselves with Putin while the Orthodox Church will align itself with Medvedev. Indeed, reports indicate that security forces represent as much as 70 percent of the top Kremlin administration – remaining largely loyal to Putin – while Medvedev has maintained his close ties with the patriarch of Russia.[9]
Meanwhile, Medvedev has placed considerable emphasis during his presidency on restructuring Russia’s armed forces while redirecting Russia’s intelligence services toward keeping the post-Soviet space under Russian influence.[10] Elements of the military could become major power brokers in such a showdown for two principal reasons.
First, Russia’s armed forces and defense industries have been stagnant in recent years.[11] Whichever candidate chooses to put the largest emphasis on rebuilding Russia’s armed forces could earn the support of key members of military. Moreover, this would fit very nicely with the need of the Kremlin to address Russia’s growing nuclear and conventional inferiority vis-à-vis NATO and the United States, which it has already begun to do as described above.
Second, there may well be an appetite among elements of Russia’s security and intelligence services to return to the practice of territorial expansion and regional subversion as Russia begins to assert itself more strongly on the world stage once again. This has already been noted in Russia’s attempts to block Kosovo’s path to international recognition as well as in Russia’s support for the territorial dismemberment of Georgia and Moldova. This goes well beyond mere attempts to prevent former Soviet republics from succumbing to Western influence.
If this trend continues, then Russia’s armed forces clearly have a role to play. In fact, they have already begun to play that role through the previously noted occupation of parts of Moldova and Georgia. This potential bridge between Russia’s armed forces and its security and intelligence could be an opportunity for Putin to expand his reach in the power-brokering process in time for a potential run for Russia’s presidency.
Hence, one can expect Russia’s military to begin to play a larger role within Russian politics and foreign policy in the years ahead. We are likely to see Russian attempts to deepen business and trade relations both on the regional and global market in order to finance the revitalization of its military. Furthermore, it is certain that Russia will continue its assertiveness in the Arctic, either through negotiations (e.g. with Norway[12]) or, failing that, through the possible mobilization of elements of its armed forces toward the north over the long term. Indeed, with America’s likely retreat from its unique superpower status over the decades ahead, the United States will be less likely to come to the defense of its allies, possibly leaving Canada and Denmark vulnerable to a limited military conflict with Russia in the Arctic.[13]
These long-term implications for the Russian military compiled with the continued stern foreign policy outlook of the Kremlin must have consequences for U.S. policy. First, cooperation with Russia on the missile defense front — the most effective way to ensure the security of America’s liberal democratic allies in Europe without provoking NATO-Russian brinksmanship – should be Washington’s preference. This includes sharing missile defense technology with Moscow in order to allow the latter to deploy mid-course interceptors with more facility as well as helping Russia achieve the ability to defend itself more effectively against Chinese missiles without the former drastically increasing its number of deployed offensive missiles.
Furthermore, this means allowing Russia to be responsible for missile defense in Ukraine as a confidence-building measure. It is one thing for the United States to deploy missile defense systems in former Warsaw Pact turned NATO states such as Poland or Romania. It’s a very different thing to do so in a non-NATO former Soviet republic. Russian responsibility for missile defense in Ukraine will allow the former to bolster its relative influence in part of the post-Soviet space while Western states won’t have to fully sacrifice their interests in the same region as they will continue to hold sway in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia. In essence, this strategy will allow for Western states to advance their missile defense interests while working with Russia on issues relevant to the Kremlin.
The Limits of Western Power in the Former Soviet Space
Western states need to realize that turning the entire post-Soviet space into a zone free of Russian influence is not achievable over the long term. Instead of continuing with the zero-sum game of posing our principal goals in opposition to Russia’s, the United States should seek more creative ways to partner with Moscow so that both countries’ vital interests can be achieved. This does not necessarily mean acquiescing to Russian political, economic and military dominance (or monopoly) in Ukraine, but missile defense is an area in which NATO-Russian cooperation is possible.
From Russia’s perspective, missile defense can be done in cooperation with Moscow, or it can proceed unilaterally against the latter’s interests. If the purpose of missile defense is to be free of a nuclear attack from Iran, then unilateralism leading to NATO-Russian brinksmanship – which in essence means that NATO states would then have to address two nuclear threats (Iran and Russia) — clearly works against Western interests. From where NATO stands, cooperation with Moscow is possible. Cooperation with Tehran is not. It is in NATO’s interest to reduce the number of serious nuclear threats it must confront.
Moreover, an increase in Russian clout in the post-Soviet space with the consent of Western states could be an effective way of containing China militarily. Although China’s economic rise cannot be contained, its strategic military options can very well be limited if it has to deal with a more powerful Russia to its north that is more inclined to cooperate with the West on issues of international security following the NATO-Russia cooperation outlined above.
China's Dong Feng 31 (DF-31) ballistic missiles on parade.
Second, if international sanctions fail to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and if preventive military action is not taken against Iran’s nuclear facilities, NATO states should prioritize securing their offensive military capabilities ahead of deploying larger missile defense systems across Europe. The former will likely be the more effective way to prevent an Iranian first strike, either through NATO preemptive military action against Iran or though the threat of massive retaliation in order to achieve deterrence. Deploying missile defense too quickly and without Moscow’s consent throughout Europe may lead to brinksmanship between NATO and Russia which in turn increases the possibility of nuclear war – limited or otherwise – on the Old Continent. Missile defense across Europe should be viewed as a progression and not as a swift action.
Third, the United States should seek closer defense ties with Canada. Although Canada’s previous prime minister – the Liberal Paul Martin – showed hesitation in developing missile defense ties with the United States, Canada’s current head of government – the Conservative Stephen Harper – has already demonstrated his will not only to play a role in the deployment of missile defense systems across Europe[14], but also to increase security ties with the United States through the recently-signed “Beyond the Border” perimeter security deal.[15] Because of Harper’s willingness to back European missile defense, the White House should press Ottawa once again to make Canada-U.S. missile defense cooperation a priority for both states. Such a course of action could yield many benefits: it could serve as a trial run for the potential deployment of a full missile defense system across Europe, it is unlikely to alienate Moscow seriously (unlike a missile defense system in Europe), and it could be partnered with an expansion of NORAD.
Finally, regardless of the results of the Russian presidential election next year, Washington must reassert its commitment to its allies’ security. This means providing consistent core funding for the American military in the decades ahead with a particular focus on the expansion of the U.S. Navy so as to secure America’s global reach and to ensure that the global economy can continue to operate within the context of an U.S.-provided security framework. With the Russian armed forces set to gain additional clout in the decade(s) ahead, Western states should be very careful that plans to allow Moscow to assume a larger role in the post-Soviet space do not lead to Russian military boldness elsewhere. If the United States fails to convince its allies – particularly those with Arctic claims – that it will defend them in their time of need, then the reliability of collective security within NATO’s charter will be questioned and America’s decline as the global superpower may become set in stone.
Zach Paikin is a research associate at the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs.
[1] Cordesman, Anthony H.; Kleiber, Martin. Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat in the Northern Gulf. Greenwood, 2007; p. 151.
[2] Federation of American Scientists: http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/militarysumfolder/shahab-3.html
[3] Ryan, Kevin. “Preventing the Unthinkable”, The Journal of International Security Affairs (Number 20, Spring/Summer 2011). Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 2011; pp. 36-37.
[4] Ryan, Kevin. “Preventing the Unthinkable”, The Journal of International Security Affairs (Number 20, Spring/Summer 2011). Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 2011; pp. 34-35.
[5] Rousseau, Richard. “La Russie et le bouclier antimissile européen”, Global Brief, July 15, 2011: http://globalbrief.ca/richardrousseau/2011/07/15/la-russie-et-le-bouclier-antimissile-europeen/
[6] Payne, Keith. “Off to a Bad START”, The Journal of International Security Affairs (Number 19, Fall/Winter 2010), Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 2010: http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/19/payne.php
[7] Payne, Keith. “Off to a Bad START”, The Journal of International Security Affairs (Number 19, Fall/Winter 2010), Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 2010: http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/19/payne.php
[8] Blank, Stephen. “Nonproliferation, Russian Style”, The Journal of International Security Affairs (Number 19, Fall/Winter 2010), Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 2010: http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/19/blank.php
[9] Kalugin, Oleg. “Russia’s Future Imperfect”, The Journal of International Security Affairs (Number 20, Spring/Summer 2011). Jewish Institute for International Security Affairs, 2011; pp. 17-18.
[10] Kalugin, Oleg. “Russia’s Future Imperfect”, The Journal of International Security Affairs (Number 20, Spring/Summer 2011). Jewish Institute for International Security Affairs, 2011; pp. 17-18.
[11] Blank, Stephen. “Nonproliferation, Russian Style”, The Journal of International Security Affairs (Number 19, Fall/Winter 2010), Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 2010: http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/19/blank.php
[12] Fjaertoft, Daniel Buikema. “Norwegian Grand Strategy and the Artic”, Global Brief, June 27, 2011: http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2011/06/27/norwegian-grand-strategy-and-the-arctic/
[13] Studin, Irvin. “Changing Luck and North America’s Wars”, Global Brief, June 27, 2011: http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2011/06/27/changing-luck-north-americas-21st-century-wars/
[14] Dowd, Alan. “NATO begins building a transatlantic missile defense”, Fraser Institute, March 9, 2011: http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/Content/research-news/research/articles/NATO-building-transatlantic-missile-defence.pdf
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